Reinventing the Development Wheel of the World Trading System (Reviewing Sonia E. Rolland, Development at the World Trade Organization (2012)) by Cho, Sungjoon
Chicago-Kent College of Law 
Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law 
All Faculty Scholarship Faculty Scholarship 
5-14-2013 
Reinventing the Development Wheel of the World Trading System 
(Reviewing Sonia E. Rolland, Development at the World Trade 
Organization (2012)) 
Sungjoon Cho 
IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, scho1@kentlaw.iit.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/fac_schol 
 Part of the Growth and Development Commons, and the International Trade Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Sungjoon Cho, Reinventing the Development Wheel of the World Trading System (Reviewing Sonia E. 
Rolland, Development at the World Trade Organization (2012)), 16 J. Int'l Econ. L. 481 (2013). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/fac_schol/736 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons @ IIT 
Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship by an authorized 
administrator of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact 
jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu. 
REINVENTING THE DEVELOPMENT WHEEL OF
THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (REVIEWING
SONIA E. ROLLAND, DEVELOPMENTAT THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION (2012))
Sungjoon Cho*
ABSTRACT
In probing how WTO norms may affect developing countries, Sonia Rolland
introduces two paradigms in this book: development as an idiosyncrasy and
development as a normative co-constituent to trade. The first paradigm
concerns development-related exceptions and carve-outs found within
WTO rules and agreements that exemplify a contingent provision of special
favors to developing countries. Overall, it represents a limited mandate on
development in the WTO. In contrast, the second paradigm embodies a
normative operationalization of development agenda within the WTO
system. It normatively reconstructs WTO rules and institutions in a way
where development is a core mandate of the WTO, on par with free trade.
In her reform proposals, the author reveals a subterranean advocacy of a shift
from the first to second paradigm. The author offers a rare in-depth account
of the past, present, and future of development in the world trading system.
This Review Essay complements the author s ambitious project by locating
some missing pieces of this grand puzzle of trade and development, such as
general trade rules and disciplines.
I. PROLOGUE: MAINSTREAMING DEVELOPMENT
Classic trade theories based on the axiom of comparative advantage view
development as a logical corollary to trade. Trade, a mutually beneficial
enterprise, brings prosperity to each nation involved. East Asian countries,
among others, provide powerful empirical confirmations of this. Under these
classic theories, development might not even warrant an independent inquiry
apart from trade: if development is a destination, trade is an auto-pilot mode
for the journey. Then, why have so many scholars, in particular those of
international trade law, struggled with the topic of development?1 In her
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1 See Robert E. Hudec, Developing Countries in the GATT Legal System (1987).
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ambitious book, Sonia Rolland offers her passionate answer to the puzzling
question. This encyclopedic study of legal and institutional aspects of devel-
opment at the World Trade Organization (WTO) is a valuable contribution
in the field. The author offers a rare in-depth account of the past, present,
and future of development in the world trading system. This book is rife with
sharp observations and rich insights. Not only trade scholars but also pol-
icymakers should have it on their shelves.
This review essay serves two main purposes. First, as a commentary rather
than a critique, it aims to encourage the general readership of the book by
helping readers digest its rich observations, arguments, and proposals.
Second, it also aims to complement the author’s ambitious project by locat-
ing some missing pieces of this grand puzzle of trade and development.
At the outset, the author acknowledges that WTO norms may affect de-
veloping countries through three main mechanisms: first, general trade rules
and disciplines, i.e. the non-discrimination principle and trade remedy rules;
second, particular exceptions to those general trade rules, such as ‘special
and differential treatment’ (SDT) provisions; third, other procedural rules
regarding decision making and dispute resolution. Only the second and third
dimensions are addressed in the book, the first one remaining largely unex-
plored.2 The book presents these two main dimensions in terms of two
paradigms: development as an idiosyncrasy and development as a normative
co-constituent to trade. These paradigms, according to the author, are
merely employed as theoretical benchmarks by which she categorizes and
analyzes the current development-related rules and institutions of the WTO.3
The first paradigm, i.e. development as an idiosyncrasy, is based on a
phenomenological account of the historic treatment of development concerns
in the WTO and its predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT). Development-related exceptions and carve-outs found
within WTO rules and agreements exemplify a contingent provision of spe-
cial favors to developing countries. This paradigm is idiosyncratic due mainly
to its ad hoc nature without any overarching principles, although such char-
acteristic also connotes political bargain and flexibility. All in all, it represents
a limited mandate on development in the WTO.4
In contrast, the second paradigm, i.e. development as normative co-
constituents, embodies a normative operationalization of development
agenda within the WTO system. It presupposes the balance, or linkage, be-
tween free trade and development. It normatively reconstructs WTO rules
and institutions in a way where development is a core mandate of the WTO,
on par with free trade. Under this paradigm, development is not second-class
and triggered in the WTO on a contingent basis, as is the case under the first
2 Sonia E. Rolland, Development at the World Trade Organization (2012), at v.
3 Ibid, at 3–4.
4 Ibid, at v.
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paradigm. Here development is an overarching principle that must constantly
guide normative operations of the WTO.5
The author emphasizes that these paradigms are purely conceptual instru-
ments, which are neither descriptive nor prescriptive in and of themselves.
Yet, a careful reader will soon discover a subterranean advocacy of a shift
from the first to second paradigm throughout the book.
II. THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF DEVELOPMENT IN THE
GATT/WTO
A. Genealogy of development discourse (pre-GATT)
The book begins with a genealogy of development discourse. Part I demon-
strates how the differing views on development between North and South in
the pre-GATT era shaped development-related norms and institutions in the
GATT/WTO. By way of theoretical background, this part introduces varying
development theories, classical and modern, presented by such scholars as
W.W. Rostow, Friedrich List, Raúl Prebisch, Arthur Lewis, H.W. Singer,
Joseph Stiglitz, and Jeffrey Sachs. This is useful in understanding not only
the theoretical, but also the ideological foundations of the development rules
subsequently shaped in the GATT/WTO system. As legal background, Part I
discusses the public international law dimension of development through the
lens of human rights and the emerging right to development. By way of
institutional background, this Part addresses post-colonial international or-
ganizations, i.e. the United Nations (UN) and its agencies, including the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the
Bretton Woods organizations, such as the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), and South–South organizations, such as regional
development banks and regional trade agreements among developing coun-
tries. It also discusses prototypical development programs, such as trade
preferences and commodity agreements.
Overall, Part I demonstrates that the weak ethos of development in the
GATT/WTO system originates from the South and North’s diverging views
on development. While the South (i.e. the UN), exemplifying the second
paradigm, attempted to provide development with a separate strong norma-
tive status, the North (i.e. the Bretton Woods institutions) preferred a soft,
ad hoc approach, representing the first paradigm.
B. Evolution of development discourse in the GATT/WTO
While Part I discusses the general background of development norms and
institutions that mostly took place outside of the global trading system, Part
5 Cf. Frank J. Garcia, Trade, Inequality, and Justice: Toward a Liberal Theory of Just Trade (2003),
at 107 (applying the Rawlsian egalitarianism (‘difference principle’) to international trade law
through a normative medium such as the SDT).
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II shifts its focus to the GATT/WTO. Here, the author tracks down how
development norms, actors, and institutions evolved within the GATT and
the subsequent WTO system. One of the most critical observations in this
part is the relatively recent discernibility of trade and development debates in
the global trading system after the Uruguay Round of negotiations, which
the author attributes to developing countries’ mounting leverage in the
WTO.6
According to the author, the aborted International Trade Organization
(ITO) was a missed opportunity for promoting development within the
world trading system. The original ambition of the ITO, which would
have established a ‘collective economic system’, encompassed strong govern-
ment protection of infant industries and commodity agreements.7 Given this
birth defect, development deficiencies had continued under the GATT, char-
acterized by chronic barriers put up by developed countries against develop-
ing countries’ main exports, such as agricultural and other labor-intensive
products. It was only with an exogenous jolt from the UNCTAD that the
GATT managed to incorporate Part IV of the GATT under the banner of
‘Trade and Development’. Subsequently, the GATT Contracting Parties also
introduced a legal ground for tariff preferences, i.e. the Generalized System
of Preferences (GSP).
The true development momentum emerged only after the end of the
Uruguay Round. The Uruguay Round was a grand bargain between the
North and the South. In return for the introduction of new areas of regula-
tion, such as trade in services (the General Agreement on Trade in Services)
and trade-related intellectual property rights (the Agreement on Trade-
Related Intellectual Property Rights), WTO members addressed, at least
formally, some chronic development deficiencies in such areas as agriculture
(the Agreement on Agriculture) and textiles (the Agreement on Textiles and
Clothing).
In general, developing countries participated in post-Uruguay Round trade
talks more vigorously than in the GATT era. This trend continued through
the Singapore Ministerial Meeting (1996), the Seattle Ministerial Meeting
(1999), and finally the launch of the current development round in Doha,
Qatar (2001). As the participation of developing countries increased, so did
their agenda-shaping power. In this regard, the author laments that the recent
Doha doldrums have eroded this long-lasting development momentum.8
C. The status quo
Against the historical backdrop discussed in Part I and II, Part III addresses
the current normative configuration of development in the WTO system.
6 Rolland, above n 2, at 59.
7 Ibid, at 65.
8 Ibid, at 104.
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This Part first spells out substantive development provisions, such as SDT
clauses, scattered across WTO agreements, as well as other institutional
issues regarding decision-making processes.
First, the garden-variety SDT provisions feature multiple functions.
According to the WTO Committee on Trade and Development, their
primary objectives include the expansion of market access by developing
countries, safeguards of developing countries’ interests, flexibility of commit-
ments, technical assistance, and unique provisions for least-developed coun-
tries (LDCs). While SDT provisions in general remain vague and hortatory,
the author reinterprets them to ‘operationalize’ their purpose in dispute reso-
lution. For example, referring to certain non-WTO legal sources including
both non-WTO treaties and domestic jurisprudence, the author suggests that
best efforts provisions be interpreted as imposing on developed countries a
due diligence obligation to take into account developing countries’ interests.9
The author goes so far as to argue that certain SDT provisions on reporting/
notification can be read as a ‘mandate for ‘‘secondary legislation’’ by the
WTO or implementation for individual members’.10
The author’s progressive hermeneutical position naturally leads to criti-
cism of conventional GATT/WTO jurisprudence in operationalizing SDT
provisions. For example, in interpreting Part IV of the GATT, the 1980
GATT panel in EC – Sugar Exports (Brazil) ruled that by increasing sugar
exports through the use of subsidies the EC failed to collaborate jointly with
developing countries to realize the principles and objectives under Articles
XXXVI and XXXVIII. This ruling, according to the author, was ‘cursory at
best, giving little guidance on the exact scope of the legal obligations under
Part IV’.11 Interestingly, the author attributes the inoperability of SDT pro-
visions to the inactivity on the part of developing countries. She argues that
‘had developing country litigants been more assertive in their Part IV claims,
or had they better honed their arguments, it is possible that a more robust
jurisprudence could have emerged’.12
Subsequently, the author probes into a number of institutional procedures
in the WTO that affect developing countries. These procedures include vari-
ous dimensions of collective decision making among WTO members, includ-
ing voting procedures, negotiation formats, the thorny issue of single
undertaking, and secondary legislation, such as internal decisions by com-
mittees and councils. Here, the author makes a critical observation: seeing is
deceiving. In other words, although the current institutional status quo ap-
pears to be based on a formal, legal equality among WTO members, its
9 Ibid, at 122.
10 Ibid, at 130.
11 Ibid, at 147.
12 Ibid, at 152.
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practical impact may be to disfranchise some developing members.13
According to the author, this disparity between the law on the books and
law in action is a normative flaw to the extent that it represents the paucity of
WTO discourse on the normative implications of the trade and development
relationship.
D. Reform agenda
Against the backdrop of criticisms on the status quo in Part III, Part IV of
the book advances a rich menu of reform options involving, inter alia, SDT
and the dispute settlement mechanism. For example, some developing coun-
tries have advocated the idea of ‘multilateral SDT’, which calls for certain
benchmarks that would automatically trigger access to SDT.14 These bench-
marks may include a list of qualifying countries or a set of economic indi-
cators. Granted, these qualifying criteria may be controversial. Nonetheless,
in some well-defined issue areas, such as LDCs, these might be effective.
For example, one might recall that the WTO waiver of Article 31 of the
TRIPS Agreement15 was specifically designed for LDCs. In the same vein,
WTO members also agreed to accord the duty-free, quota-free market access
to LDCs in the Hong Kong Ministerial Meeting.
A bolder reform proposal focuses on the dispute settlement system, in
particular the WTO tribunal’s approach to treaty interpretation. In a con-
scious effort to mainstream development within the WTO context, the
author argues that the WTO tribunal should embrace development-oriented
‘overarching interpretive principles’.16 According to the author, these prin-
ciples may include the ‘development-fostering versus development-stifling’
test or the ‘least development-restrictive’ test.17
III. UNEARTHING A HIDDEN AGENDA: MAINSTREAMING TRADE
A. Trade and development versus development in trade
This book provides an inclusive account of development as it relates to the
GATT/WTO system. Its rich stocktaking and insightful proposals will un-
doubtedly make considerable contributions to future discussion and negoti-
ation in the field. However, the book does leave behind one blind spot—
general trade rules and disciplines as they are related to development.
Spotlighting the blind spot will greatly complement the author’s observations
and proposals.
13 Ibid, at 240.
14 Ibid, at 292.
15 Decision of the General Council of 30 August 2003, Implementation of paragraph 6 of the
Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and public health, WT/L/540 and Corr.1
(1 September 2003).
16 Rolland, above n 2, at 308.
17 Ibid.
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The main thesis of the book is a call for rebalancing between trade and
development norms, i.e. mainstreaming development. Here, development
norms are overarching principles that are conceptually distinguishable from
trade norms. For example, SDT provisions are exogenous additions to the
WTO in the sense that they do not originate from general trade rules and
disciplines. SDT provisions are not a codification of the GATT acquis and lie
outside of the GATT/WTO jurisprudential evolution. Rather, they are incor-
porated via political bargaining, which characterizes their inherently elusive
properties. Yet, these properties tend to precipitate a dilemma.
On the one hand, if SDT provisions are of a trade-restricting nature, such
as derogations and waivers, their full operationalization, either by multilater-
alization through certain qualifying benchmarks18 or by unilateralization
through reservations,19 are prone to the so-called ‘Faustian bargain’.
Sidney Weintraub critically observed that developing countries’ bargaining
usually limited access to foreign markets for waivers from GATT rules and
disciplines.20 In other words, developing countries often receive SDT in
return for the exclusion of their most competitive export products from
trade preferences. Damage to developing countries from such exclusions
might have outweighed any potential benefits from SDT,21 which might
result in a ‘reverse’ SDT.22 On the other hand, trade-enhancing SDT provi-
sions, such as best efforts clauses, may be better situated for a synergistic
achievement of both trade and development than trade-restricting SDT
provisions.
The author espouses a ‘development-fostering measure’ test in an effort to
mainstream development by employing overarching interpretive principles.23
Such a test would require developed country WTO members to consider the
least development-restrictive measures in compliance with general WTO dis-
ciplines. However, this progressive interpretation may be seen as undue ju-
dicial activism and thus may invite political backlash. One should be mindful
of the fact that SDTs are vague since that is exactly what their framers
desired. We have little GATT/WTO jurisprudence in this area not because
18 Ibid, at 292–94.
19 Ibid, at 294–97.
20 Michael J. Trebilcock and Robert Howse, The Regulation of International Trade (2d ed. 1999),
at 368.
21 These alleged benefits from exemptions, such as infant industry protection, remain contro-
versial. Bernard M. Hoekman and Michel M. Kostecki, The Political Economy of the World
Trading System: The WTO and Beyond (2d ed. 2001), at 408.
22 Ablasse Ouedraogo, Seminar on Special and Differential Treatment for Developing
Countries, Closing Remarks (7 March 2000), at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_
e/sem01_e/sdtrem_e.htm. Cf. Joseph E. Stiglitz, ‘Two Principles for the Next Round or, How
to Bring Developing Countries in from the Cold’, 23 World Economy (2000) 437, at 437–38
(criticizing the developed countries’ ‘hypocrisy’ when they continuously exhort developing
countries towards further market openings, while they still maintain trade barriers in sectors
of natural comparative advantage for developing countries).
23 Rolland, above n 2, at 308.
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developing countries under-exploited SDTs, but because developing coun-
tries could not use them due to their inherent inoperability.
The aforementioned dilemma is endemic to the exogenous nature of the
mainstreaming of development. As long as development is juxtaposed with
trade as a non-trade factor, as seen in the slogan of trade and development,
development value may cancel off trade value in an entropic fashion, or
development value itself may not be subject to full operationalization due
to the lack of textual clarity. At this juncture, the first dimension of devel-
opment in the WTO, i.e. the general trade rules and disciplines, which
remains beyond the scope of the book, may neutralize the dilemma.
Embracing general trade rules and disciplines, such as the national treatment
obligation and antidumping/subsidies disciplines, is to regard development
not as an exogenous but as ‘endogenous’ value that emerges within free
trade. This new approach prioritizes mainstreaming trade over mainstream-
ing development. As protectionism still remains one of the biggest threats to
development, the potential that general trade rules and disciplines could
contribute to development is enormous. It is especially so in the new trade
reality characterized by global value chains.24 As the era of ‘mono-location’
production has begun disappearing, so has the traditional mercantilist appeal
to reciprocity. In a global value chain, international trade is a cooperative
project, rather than a win-or-lose competition. Even a small country can take
up a niche and create some value. Note that nearly 60% of all global trade is
now in some type of parts and components, not final products. Given the
situation, ‘trade facilitation’ augurs well to developing countries. As the
WTO Deputy Director-General Valentine Rugwabiza recently observed,
‘[R]educed transit and transaction costs would be especially beneficial to
small and medium-size enterprises operating in landlocked countries’, such
as in Africa.25
Under the general trade rules and disciplines approach, development is
endogenized within the WTO jurisprudence without reference to any explicit
SDT provision. Examples are legion. Reformulated Gasoline (1996),26 the
very first decision under the WTO system, is a case in point. In this case,
two developing countries, Venezuela and Brazil, sued a developed country,
the USA, challenging the latter’s environmental regulation (the ‘Gasoline
Rule’), which imposed a stricter standard on the imported gasoline than
the domestic one. Although the Appellate Body agreed with the USA that
its measure was indeed a legitimate environmental policy relating to the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources under GATT Article XX(g),
24 See Sungjoon Cho and Claire R. Kelly, ‘Are World Trading Rules Passé?: Trade Anachronism
and Its Discontents’, 53 Virginia Journal of International Law (forthcoming in 2013).
25 WTO News, DDG Rugwabiza calls on ECOSOC to fight protectionism, 3 July 2012.
26 United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, Panel and Appellate Body
Report adopted on 20 May 1996, WT/DS2/9.
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it eventually struck the rule on the ground that it constituted unjustifiable
discrimination and disguised restriction on international trade within the
meaning of the chapeau of that Article. The Appellate Body held that:
We have above located two omissions on the part of the United States:
to explore adequately means, including in particular cooperation with
the governments of Venezuela and Brazil, of mitigating the administra-
tive problems relied on as justification by the United States for rejecting
individual baselines for foreign refiners; and to count the costs for foreign
refiners that would result from the imposition of statutory baselines . . . In
the light of the foregoing, our conclusion is that the baseline establishment
rules in the Gasoline Rule, in their application, constitute ‘‘unjustifiable
discrimination’’ and a ‘‘disguised restriction on international trade.’’27
Given that co-complainants in this case were developing countries, the
Appellate Body’s potential remedy in this case—a ‘cooperative arrange-
ment’—connotes development-conscious efforts by a developed country re-
spondent. One might reasonably speculate that the USA would provide
certain technical assistance to Venezuela and Brazil in the course of such
cooperative arrangement. In this regard, the Reformulated Gasoline case law
can be extrapolated to other disputes concerning regulatory discrimination
involving developing countries. This implicit ‘duty to consider’, if applied to
a developed importing country, can internalize development concerns within
general WTO trade rules and disciplines.
Indeed, the Appellate Body reaffirmed this approach in the subsequent
Shrimp/Turtle case (1998) involving several developing countries (India,
Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand) and a developed country, the USA. In this
dispute, the USA banned the import of shrimp from these developing countries
on the ground that they failed to meet its environmental regulatory guidelines
(‘1996 Guidelines’) under Section 609, which inter alia required foreign shrim-
pers to use ‘turtle excluder devices’. As it did in Reformulated Gasoline, the
Appellate Body highlighted the chapeau under GATT Article XX. It held that:
[I]t is not acceptable, in international trade relations, for one WTO
Member to use an economic embargo to require other Members to
adopt essentially the same comprehensive regulatory program, to achieve
a certain policy goal, as that in force within that Member’s territory, with-
out taking into consideration different conditions which may occur in the
territories of those other Members.28
Thus, the Appellate Body ruled that the USA measure in question, i.e. certain
parts of the 1996 Guidelines under Section 609, was unjustifiable
27 Ibid, at 28.
28 United States–Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, AB-1998-4, WT/DS58/
AB/R, para 164 (emphasis in original).
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discrimination under the chapeau of GATT Article XX. Similar to the
Reformulated Gasoline case law, the Shrimp/Turtle case law can also be tapped
to check developmentally pernicious regulatory unilateralism often exercised by
developed countries such as the USA and the EU. Developed importing coun-
tries should consider the unique conditions of developing exporting countries.
This endogenization of development within the ordinary WTO jurispru-
dence is also conceivable in case a developing country is an importing,
regulating country. In Brazil-Tyres (2007),29 Brazil banned the import of
retreaded tyres from the EU since these tyres could provide feeding grounds
for mosquitoes responsible for various diseases, such as yellow fever, malaria,
and dengue. Although Brazil admitted that such ban would provisionally
constitute a violation of GATT Article XI:1, it claimed that the ban was
necessary to protect human health under GATT Article XX (b), namely,
that no other reasonable alternatives existed. In reviewing those alternative
measures, the panel took into account a development dimension of the
Brazilian ban in this case. The panel viewed that:
The evidence suggests that the most up-to-date technology that can con-
trol toxic emissions to minimum levels is not necessarily readily available,
mostly for financial reasons.30
Brazil has demonstrated that the currently available disposal methods capable
of handling the existing volumes of waste tyres, namely landfilling, stock-
piling and tyre incineration, even if performed under controlled condi-
tions, pose risks to human health and cannot constitute an alternative to
the import ban.31
While this endogenization approach is largely beyond the scope of this
book, the author appears to acknowledge its possibility. In her discussion
of Antigua’s cross-retaliation against the USA in the TRIPS sector, she ob-
serves that:
[S]omewhat surprisingly, both the parties and the arbitrators have made
development arguments, and factored a party’s developing status into their
analyses, despite the lack of SDT language in Article 22. The willingness to
take into account development considerations is all the more unexpected
given the timidity that parties and adjudication have shown in invoking
SDT provisions where they do exist.32
One might sympathize with the author’s frustration at the WTO tribunal’s
failure in invoking SDT provisions. It would be ideal for the WTO tribunal
to judicially operationalize those SDT provisions in its decision. Perhaps the
29 Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R, Appellate Body
Report circulated on 3 December 2007.
30 Ibid, at para 7.193 (emphasis added).
31 Ibid, at para 7.195 (emphasis added).
32 Rolland, above n 2, at 185 (emphasis added).
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WTO tribunal may still wait for a perfect dispute in which it can do so.
Nonetheless, as the author herself admits, most, if not all, SDT provisions
remain vague and inoperable in actual adjudications. For example, most
capacity building clauses allow developed country donors to decide ‘how,
when, and to which members’ they accord technical assistance.33 Yet judi-
cially forcing developed country donors to come up with certain ‘remedies’34
based on such vague provisions would be both impracticable and undesir-
able. It would be impracticable given the current WTO governance struc-
ture, which is not a world government; it would be undesirable in that such
judicial activism undermines the very integrity of the decision.
IV. EPILOGUE: THE CULTURE OF THE WTO
Let me close this review essay by raising two additional issues that the book
does not fully engage but that still warrant special attention in promoting
development within the WTO system: ‘administrative barriers’ and the
‘GATS Mode 4 (Free Movement of Natural Persons)’. First, garden-variety
administrative barriers, such as rules of origin, complex standards,35 and
antidumping measures,36 seriously impede market access of developing
country exporters. For example, sub-Saharan African apparel products are
subject to duty and quota-free access to the US market under the African
Growth and Opportunities Act only if they are manufactured in those coun-
tries ‘from the U.S. fabric, formed from U.S. yarn cut in the United
States’.37 Some testing requirements imposed by developed countries are
prohibitively costly for developing country exporters.38 More often than
not, antidumping measures by developed country governments targeting de-
veloping countries’ main exports, such as basic metals, plastic, rubber, chem-
ical products, and textiles, nullify the latter’s comparative advantage. Given
the exorbitant costs in responding to antidumping investigations, the mere
launch of the investigation is enough to dissuade developing countries from
accessing developed countries’ markets.39 In sum, such administrative pro-
tectionism, if left unchecked, tends to cartelize the global market and further
33 Ibid, at 115.
34 Ibid, at 122.
35 See generally John S. Wilson and Victor O. Abiola (eds), Standards and Global Trade: A Voice
for Africa (2003).
36 OECD, Analysis of Non-Tariff Barriers of Concern to Developing Countries, OECD Trade
Policy Working Paper No. 16, TD/TC/WP(2004)47/FINAL, 3 June 2005 (hereinafter
OECD, Analysis).
37 Luis Jorge Garay S. and Rafael Cornejo, ‘Rules of Origin and Trade References’, in Bernard
Hoekman et al., (eds), Development, Trade, and the WTO: A Handbook (2002), at 114, 115.
38 OECD, Analysis, above n 36, at 18.
39 Elizabeth L. Gunn, ‘Eliminating the Protectionist Free Ride: The Need for Cost
Redistribution in Antidumping Cases’, 28 Boston College International and Comparative
Law review (2005), at 165, 175.
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cripples small players from developing countries to benefit from the global
value chains.40
Second, WTO members should revisit the unique opportunities provided
by free movement of natural persons (Mode 4) of the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS). The agenda’s characteristic win-win situation
between developed and developing countries has widely been documented.41
The undeniable trend of a global demographic situation is also a powerful
justification for embracing this new area of international trade. Although
negotiation on the agenda remains largely deadlocked due to its politically
combustible nature, scholars have presented a number of practicable policy
proposals, such as a ‘GATS visa’.42 For the world trading system to be truly
equitable, the WTO members must somehow activate this agenda.
A final note of caution: bringing development into trade should not trans-
late into the WTO’s monopoly on this cause. The WTO cannot, and should
not, shoulder by itself this daunting charge. The WTO must continue col-
laborating with development agencies, such as the World Bank and the
UNCTAD. NGOs and civil society can also play a critical role in providing
not only advocacy but also practical technical assistance. Perhaps most im-
portantly, domestic governance of developing countries remains the essential
component of development.43
In closing, the normative fulfillment of development in the WTO, which is
the leitmotif of the book, will not arrive until the culture of the WTO
changes. As eloquently demonstrated in the recent deadlock of the Doha
Round talks, the WTO members are still preoccupied by the old mercantilist
culture. In turn, the WTO’s culture will not change until its members realize
that the WTO is not a mere sum of contractual transactions but a community
where we collectively create and share prosperity. As the author rightly points
out, this will be a ‘long-term’ enterprise.44
40 See Bela Balassa, The Newly Industrializing Countries in the World Economy (1981), at 118–19
(discussing ‘international cartels’ and ‘market-sharing’ in some industries, including textiles
and shoes, resulting from new protectionist moves by developed countries which feared com-
petition from developing countries).
41 OECD, Service Providers on the Move: Labor Mobility and the WTO General Agreement on Trade
in Services (2003), at 3; The Guardian, Migrants’ Billions Put Aid in the Shade, 31 January
2013.
42 See, e.g. Sungjoon Cho, ‘Development by Moving People: Unearthing the Development
Potential of a GATS Visa’, in Joel P. Trachtman and Chantal Thomas (eds), Developing
Countries in the WTO Legal System (2009), at 457.
43 Gerald M. Meier and James E. Rauch, Leading Issues in Economic Development 7th ed. (2000),
at 213–40 (highlighting the importance of education and human capital in economic devel-
opment); Dani Rodrik, U.N. Dev. Programme, The Global Governance of Trade: as if
Development Really Mattered 10 (October 2001) (emphasizing the critical contribution of
‘domestic institutional innovations’ to economic development), available at http://www.undp.
org/mainundp/propoor/docs/pov_ globalgovernancetrade_pub.pdf.
44 Rolland, above n 2, at 331.
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